The Greatness of Mariano, Part 3

What was Mariano Rivera’s best season?

Was it 1996, when he came out of nowhere to be the bullpen workhorse for the World Series champion Yankees, throwing 107 innings, giving up 73 hits, striking out 130, finishing third in Cy Young voting as a middle reliever, giving up one run in 14.1 innings in the postseason, and prompting Twins’ manager Tom Kelly to say “We don’t need to face him anymore… He needs to pitch in a higher league, if there is one. Ban him from baseball. He should be illegal.”

Or maybe it was 1999, when he led the league in saves, held opponents to a .176 average and a .476 OPS, didn’t give up a run in 12.1 postseason innings, finished third again in Cy Young voting, and was named World Series MVP?

Or maybe it was 2004, when he racked up 53 saves in 57 opportunities, finished third again in Cy Young voting, and ninth in the MVP vote?

No, it has to be 2005, when he came in with a career-best 1.38 ERA, gave up 9 extra-base hits in 283 at bats, allowed only 2 of 18 inherited runners to score, and finished second in Cy Young and ninth again in MVP voting.

How about 2008 when he notched a 1.40 ERA, gave up a ridiculous 41 hits and 6 walks against 77 strikeouts in 70.2 innings, held opponents to a .190 on-base percentage, and blew only one save all year?

Wait – how about 2009, when he saved 44 in 46 opportunities and gave up one run in 16 postseason innings to lead the Yankees to another World Series championship?

Is there any other player in baseball history – not just a relief pitcher, but any player at all – whose best season is so difficult to pick out?

Observations About Aaron Judge

I don’t usually write about what’s happening right now in MLB. Honestly, I don’t have the time to write fast enough to keep up. But I’m going to make an exception here because I’ve been thinking about Aaron Judge, why he’s been so bad in the postseason, and what it will take for him to get better.

Aaron Judge is a unique hitter. I know we all know that, but I’m not sure we recognize the extent to which he is unique. His uniqueness is his strength, but it is also his vulnerability. Let me try to summarize what I am getting at.

  1. Aaron Judge is, by far, the greatest hitter of all time when not striking out.
  2. This is because, when he puts the ball in play, he hits it very hard more consistently than anyone else in history.
  3. He is able to do this for three reasons. One, his immense size and strength; two, his picture-perfect swing; three, and most germane to this discussion, his refusal to compromise the integrity of his swing in any situation.
  4. As a result of his refusal to compromise his swing, he is particularly helpless when swinging at pitches outside the strike zone.

Now I will elaborate on each of these points.

Point 1

This is actually quite easy to establish. I pulled the stats of the eight guys with the highest Adjusted OPS+ in MLB history and calculated their slash lines (Avg/OBP/Slugging) when not striking out. Here they are:

  • Ruth: .406/.535/.819
  • Williams: .379/.519/.698
  • Bonds: .353/.506/.719
  • Gehrig: .377/.482/.702
  • Hornsby: .391/.456/.629
  • Judge: .436/.563/.915
  • Trout: .409/.528/.795
  • Mantle: .378/.507./.706

That’s clear, isn’t it? His Career OPS when not striking out is 1.478. Judge is the best. It’s not even close.

Point 2

I can’t establish this with certainty because obviously we don’t have batted ball data for older players. But Judge certainly rules this category among modern players. To be clear, I’m talking about his average batted ball, not the maximum; there are a few others such as Ohtani, Oneil Cruz, and Stanton whose max exit velocity is higher than Judge’s.

There are a number of advanced statistics that attempt to measure how hard a player is hitting the ball. The best known is exit velocity. Judge has led the league in average exit velocity four straight seasons.

Another advanced statistic is “barrels”. I will admit that I’m not entirely clear on what constitutes a barrel, but whatever it is, Aaron Judge is a helluva lot better at it than anyone else. Here are the leaders for the last three seasons in barrels per batted ball (i.e. per ball put in play, anything other than a strikeout):

2022:

  1. Judge, 26.5%
  2. Alvarez, 21.0%
  3. Schwarber, 20.1%
  4. Trout, 19.7%
  5. Stanton, 19.3%

2023:

  1. Judge, 27.5%
  2. Ohtani, 19.6%
  3. Alvarez, 18%
  4. JD Martinez, 17.1%
  5. Matt Chapman, 17.1%

2024:

  1. Judge, 26.9%
  2. Ohtani, 21.5%
  3. Stanton, 20.7%
  4. Soto, 19.7%
  5. Michael Toglia, 17.3%

Aaron Judge hits the ball harder, more consistently, than anyone else. And that’s why he’s the greatest hitter that ever lived when not striking out.

Why is Judge able to hit the ball so hard, when he does hit it? This is more subjective, but watching him so much over the years, I think it comes down to his physique and his swing.

Points 3 and 4

Obviously the man is immensely strong. He’s probably one of the strongest players ever to play the game. His height, while it does give him a big strike zone, also enables him to cover the plate. He can easily barrel a ball on the outside corner and hit it out to right.

In turn, he has adopted a hitting style uniquely suited to take advantage of his size and strength. He knows he does not need to pull the ball; he just needs to barrel it. This allows him to simplify his approach immensely. He does not need to look for a pitch in a particular location; he can go with it. Pitches at the edge of the zone that other hitters can’t barrel, he can. And if the gets the barrel to it, he wins.

But as important as his physique is, his swing is more important. We’ve all seen it in slow-motion a hundred times now – smooth, fluid, balanced, on plane, and yet incredibly powerful. And he repeats it every single time. He doesn’t choke up with two strikes; he doesn’t try to just put it in play; he’s not hitting behind the runner, or trying to hit a sac fly, or any of that. He has one swing, it’s his “A” swing, and he never, ever changes it based on the situation.

It’s this invariability of his swing that I want to focus on. My theory is that it’s this invariability that has enabled him to refine and perfect his swing so masterfully, almost like a golfer. Combined with his size and strength, it enables him to get the barrel to the ball more than anyone else when the ball is in his hitting zone – which includes most of the strike zone.

But there’s a trade off, and we’ve already alluded to it. He doesn’t foul off pitches off the plate with two strikes, because you have to change your swing to do that. He either takes them or strikes out. He hits very few bloopers, or weak grounders, or pop-ups, because most soft contact is the result of a defensive swing, and Aaron Judge doesn’t do defensive swings. He’s also a terrible bad ball hitter. Remember the home run Stanton hit in Game 1 off Jack Flaherty, where he went down and golfed that breaking ball? Judge, with all due respect, could never do that.

So this picture-perfect, repeatable, almost robotic (in a good way) swing makes him the greatest hitter that ever lived on balls in the zone; but it makes him absolutely incapable of hitting, or even spoiling, balls outside the zone. If he gets a hit with two strikes, it’s because the pitcher missed his location. The kind of epic at bat that Soto had in ALCS Game 5, fouling off a bunch of tough pitches until he got one he could handle, is inconceivable for Judge.

What it really comes down to is this: he can’t chase. If he chases, he’s toast. Where he’s gotten better over the years is reducing his chase rate. His 2024 chase rate was 18.7%, the lowest of his career and almost ten percent lower than the MLB average of 28.5%. And, supporting what I’ve been saying, when he does chase, he makes contact only 42.7% of the time, 15% lower than the MLB average.

The thing is, in spite of all the walks he draws, he is fundamentally and temperamentally an aggressive hitter. He goes up there looking to do damage, not to get on base. In the regular season, he’s gotten very good at controlling and channeling that aggression by laying off tough pitches. In the postseason, probably because of the immense pressure that is on him, he has been unable to do that, and pitchers are using his aggressiveness against him. Somehow he has to get back to normal, let the game come to him, let those pitches go, and get into hitters’ counts. If he can do that, I am confident the real Aaron Judge will emerge.

As frustrating as it is to see him refuse to change his swing with two strikes and strike out, the repeatability of his swing is what makes him Aaron Judge. He just has to swing at pitches he can reach. If he does not get himself out by chasing, he’s the best hitter that ever lived. If I were him – and what do I know – I would resolve in the next couple games not to swing at a breaking ball until he has two strikes. They have no intention of throwing him a breaking ball in the zone. If that means you take the occasional mistake hanger, so be it.

The Greatness of Mariano, Part 2

We all know that Mariano was great in the postseason. But how great was he, exactly?

The numbers tell the tale:

GW-LIPHERBBKERASaves
968-11418611211100.7042
Mariano Rivera, postseason career

I think we’ve all heard about his postseason greatness so much that we’ve become desensitized to how amazing that stat line actually is… an ERA of 0.70 over a span of 141 innings in 96 games, in the highest leverage situations imaginable? Oh, and I forgot to mention – two home runs allowed in those 141 innings. The same number of postseason home runs allowed by Emmanuel Clase, the greatest closer in baseball right now, in one-third of an inning last night. Rivera, in those 96 postseason appearances, gave up more than one earned run exactly once. Clase has done it twice in the past two weeks.

There are so many ways to look at how great this is. One that I decided to investigate is: has any reliever in MLB history ever had a span of 96 games – not postseason games, but any games – with a better ERA than that? And the answer is yes – but only one. Can you guess who it is? I wouldn’t have.

I know the suspense is killing you, so I’ll tell you. Wade Davis of the 2014-2015 Royals had a span of 96 regular season games from late April 2014 through early July 2015 in which his stats were:

GW-LIPHERBBKERASaves
9612-296.2485281200.4712
Wade Davis, April 2014 – July 2015

The crazy thing is that for most of that period, Davis wasn’t the Royals’ closer. Greg Holland was. The 2014 Royals may have had the greatest bullpen in MLB history with Holland, Davis, and Kelvin Herrera. And Davis’ postseason performance in 2014 and 2015 is right up there with Rivera’s. He gave up one run in 25 innings. Considered as a span, Davis 2014-2015 is arguably the greatest two-season relief pitching span in MLB history. Of course there is no comparison in terms of leverage – Davis’ span was mostly compiled in the regular season, and he wasn’t even the closer. But he was darn good.

So there you have it. Mariano’s postseason career, if considered as a span of games, represents the second-greatest 96-game span that any reliever has ever had.

Roy Face and the 1959 Pirates

Roy Face in 1959 went 18-1 as a reliever – the best single-season W-L% of all time for a pitcher with more than 12 decisions.  Moreover, he did this for a mediocre Pirates team that went 78-76.  How in the world did this happen?

First off, let’s give the man some credit – he pitched well.  He had a 2.70 ERA and a 142 ERA+.  But in 1962, he had a 1.88 ERA and went 8-7.  In 1960 he had a 2.90 ERA and went 10-8.  In 1967 he had a 2.42 ERA and went 7-5.  So obviously the stars aligned somehow in 1959.

For a moment, it’s worth reminding ourselves how relievers get decisions.  A reliever who enters a game with his team ahead or behind usually does not get a decision.  Most of the time, he gets a decision only if the lead changes while he is in the game (or as a result of runners he is responsible for after leaving the game) and that lead is not relinquished.  For a modern closer who enters the game only in a save situation, a decision is possible only if he blows the save.  For a reliever who comes into a game trailing, a decision is possible only if his offense comes back and ties the game, regardless of how well he pitches. 

The situation where a reliever has a good chance of getting a decision is a tie game.  In a tie game, any run makes the current pitchers the pitchers of record.  So the way for a reliever to pile up decisions is to enter lots of tie games.

Now, to come back to Roy Face in 1959.  Looking at his game log, it really comes down to three things:

  1. He entered a lot of tie games and pitched extremely well in those games.
  2. He blew a lot of saves, creating a lot of W/L opportunities for himself.
  3. He was the beneficiary of incredible, dramatic run support from his offense.

Tie Games

Face entered 12 tie games.  In 2 of those games, he inherited runners who later scored, and Face did not get a decision.  In the other 10 games, he entered with nobody on base.  In those games, he went 10-0.  Think about that.  Ten times, Roy Face came into a tie ballgame with nobody on base.  All ten times, Roy Face got the win.  In seven of the ten, he did not give up a run, and just kept pitching until the Pirates scored.  In the other 3 games, Face gave up one run and the lead, and would have gotten a loss had the Pirates not scored.  All 3 times, the Pirates scored 2 runs in the bottom of the inning to walk it off and give Face the win.

Save Situations

Roy Face blew 9 saves in 19 opportunities in 1959 – a terrible percentage. In fact, this is one of only 19 seasons in MLB history in which a reliever has had a save percentage less than 53% with at least 18 opportunities. His ERA in his 19 save opportunities was 5.56.  And somehow, in those 9 blown save games, he escaped with a 4-1 record.  Here’s a rundown:

  • April 24 – entered bottom of 7th with a one-run lead.  Gave up 2 runs in the 8th and was in line for a loss.  Pirates scored 4 in the 9th to win the game.  Face gets the win.
  • May 12 – entered bottom of 8th with a one-run lead.  Allowed an inherited runner to score and tie the game.  No decision.
  • May 14 – entered bottom of 8th with a three run lead and 2 runners on.  Allowed those 2 runs to score, plus one of his own, tie game.  Dick Stuart homered in the 9th to win the game for the Pirates.  Face gets the win.
  • June 11 – entered top of 8th with a two run lead and 2 runners on.  Allowed those 2 runs to score, plus one of his own and was in line for a loss.  Pirates put up 5 in the bottom of the 8th.  Face gets the win.
  • July 12 (game 1) – entered top of 8th with a one run lead and 2 runners on.  Got out of that jam, but allowed the tying run to score in the 9th.  Pirates won in the bottom of the 10th.  Face gets the win.
  • July 12 (game 2) – entered top of 9th with a one run lead and 1 runner on.  Allowed that run to score, plus one of his own, was removed from the game, was in line for a loss.  Pirates tied it in the 9th, taking Face off the hook.  No decision.
  • July 30 – entered bottom of 7th with a one run lead and nobody on.  Gave up the tying run in the 8th.  Pirates eventually won in 12.  No decision.
  • August 1 – entered bottom of 7th with a one run lead and two on.  Allowed both runs to score, plus 3 of his own.  Got a no decision because the inherited runners were the responsibility of the prior reliever.
  • September 11 (game 1) – entered bottom of 8th with a one run lead and one on.  Got out of that, but his luck finally ran out in the bottom of the 9th.  Gave up 2 runs, the Dodgers walked it off, and Face, who had been 17-0, got his first and only L of the season.

Other Wins

Face won 3 games where he came into a game the Pirates were trailing:

  • May 13 – entered bottom of 7th, Pirates down one.  Pirates scored 3 in the 8th to win.
  • August 9 – entered bottom of 8th, Pirates down one.  Gave up an unearned run in the 8th.  Pirates scored 2 in the 9th to tie, and 2 more in the 10th to win.
  • August 23 (game 2) – entered top of 9th, Pirates down one.  Pirates scored one in the 9th to tie, one in the 10th to win.

The only win we haven’t covered is from May 31 (game 2).  Face was awarded the win under rule 9.17(b) – he was the most effective reliever in a game in which the starter did not go 5 innings.

What Does All This Tell Us About The 1959 Pirates?

The 1959 Pirates were an unremarkable team in most respects.  They finished 4th out of 8 NL teams, 10 games behind the pennant-winning Dodgers.  They scored 651 runs and allowed 680 on the season.  They had a poor offense overall; their total of 651 runs was 6th in the NL.  But they were quite possibly the greatest clutch hitting team the game has ever seen.  Here are some of their records:

All-Time Single Season Walk-Off Wins, Team:

  • 1 (tie): 1959 Pirates – 17 (out of 78 total wins)
  • 1 (tie): 1977 Pirates – 17

Keep in mind that the 1977 Pirates played 162 games and they were actually good (96-66).

All-Time Single Season Extra Inning Wins, Team:

  • 1: 1959 Pirates – 19
  • 2(tie): 1988 Expos – 18
  • 2(tie): 1949 Indians – 18

All-Time Single Season Winning Percentage in Extra-Inning Games, Team (min. 16 games):

  1. 1949 Indians, 18-1, .947
  2. 1959 Pirates, 19-2, .905

1959 Pirates Team OPS, by Inning:

  • Innings 1-3: .679
  • Innings 4-6: .659
  • Innings 7-9: .755
  • Extra Innings: 1.008 (The ’59 Pirates and the ’49 Indians are the only 2 teams in history with >1.000 OPS in extra innings, min. 180 PA)

Some Individual Slash Lines for ’59 Pirates in Extra Innings:

  • Mazeroski: .529 BA/.556 OBP/.647 SLG (19 PA)
  • Stuart: .636/.667/1.182 (12 PA)
  • Groat: .625/.647/1.335 (16 PA)
  • Virdon: .556/.667/.667 (16 PA)
  • Clemente: .455/.500/.455 (12 PA)
  • Mejias: .625/.700/1.000 (10 PA)

Best Single Season W-L%, Blown Save Games (min. 5 decisions)

  • 5-1 Record: Dick Radatz 1964, Tyler Thornburg 2016
  • 4-1 Record: Roy Face 1959, Dale Murray 1975, Ron Davis 1979, Jim Mecir 2000, LaTroy Hawkins 2004, Junior Guerra 2019

Conclusion

We all know about the 1960 Pirates. That team was essentially the same as the 1959 team, plus Vinegar Bend Mizell. I wonder if, somehow, their performance in tight games in 1959 was a predictor of clutch performances to come? Or if it in some way sparked that special 1960 season? It seems like there is a good book in there somewhere – or at least some good interviews. It’s still possible; at least 8 guys from the ’59 team are still living:

  • Bill Mazeroski, age 84
  • Dick Schofield, age 85
  • Bennie Daniels, age 88
  • Bob Skinner, age 89
  • Bill Virdon, age 89
  • Dick Groat, age 90
  • Vern Law, age 90
  • Roy Face, age 92

Somebody get their stories before it’s too late.

Note: The game of July 9 does not have a complete play-by-play record, so I’m not 100% sure that the game was tied when Face entered in the 8th.  I am assuming that it was and including that game in the 12 tie games.

Jake Arrieta, GOAT

Jake Arrieta appears to be on the downside of his career. While we can’t rule out a resurgence, his ERA last year was 4.64, and he is 34 years old.

If Arrieta’s career is nearing the end, he will be remembered as an accomplished pitcher, but not a great one. From 2014 to 2017, he was excellent, peaking with his Cy Young Award in 2015. Otherwise, his career has been unremarkable. He is probably one of the 500 greatest pitchers of all time; perhaps there is an argument to put him in the top 300. Farther than that, we cannot go.

But for one calendar year – from June 21, 2015 to June 20, 2016 – Jake Arrieta was the greatest pitcher who ever lived.

GW-LIPHRERBBSOHRERABAOBPSLGOPS
3427-224013336325824851.20.159.220.221.441

Let’s analyze this as if it were a single season, and compare it to the greatest pitching seasons of all time.

The W-L record of 27-2 would be the greatest of all time for a starting pitcher. The only starting pitchers in history (not counting Al Spalding in 1875) who won 90% of their decisions were both in 1995 – Greg Maddux (19-2) and Randy Johnson (18-2).

The ERA of 1.20 would be the second lowest in the live ball era, second only to Gibson’s 1.12 in 1968. Arrieta’s is more valuable because he pitched in a much higher run-scoring context.

No pitcher with >100 IP has ever allowed fewer than 5 hits per 9 innings over a full season. Arrieta’s was 4.99.

Only one starting pitcher in the live ball era has had a WHIP (W + H/IP) of less than 0.8 – Pedro Martinez in 2000 with a 0.737. Arrieta’s was 0.796.

Only 6 pitchers since World War II have pitched over 200 innings and allowed 5 or fewer HRs. Arrieta allowed 5.

Arrieta’s OPS allowed of .441 would be by far the lowest all-time for a pitcher with at least 85 innings pitched. There are only 4 starting pitcher seasons (>180 IP) with an OPS allowed of less than .500:

  • Tiant 1968 (.495)
  • Maddux 1995 (.482)
  • Martinez 2000 (.473)
  • Gibson 1968 (.469)

The lowest slugging % allowed in a season with at least 150 IP in the live ball era is Gibson in 1968 with .236. Arrieta’s was .221.

Maybe, just maybe, Pedro in 2000 was better, given that he pitched in a much higher run-scoring context. Otherwise, I submit to you that Arrieta’s “season” is the greatest pitching season of all time.

The Greatness of Mariano, Part 1

I am an unabashed Mariano Rivera fan. He’s probably my favorite player of all time who isn’t named Mattingly.  And I have reflected a lot over the years about his surpassing greatness.  Calling him the greatest reliever of all time doesn’t do it justice.  With all due respect to Goose Gossage or Trevor Hoffman or Hoyt Wilhelm or whoever else might be second, he is so much better than any other reliever that somehow we need a different lens to view him through.

One way that I have thought about it is to try to conceive of how a reliever could be better than Mariano Rivera.  Is that even possible?  What would the characteristics of such a player have to be?  You could take Mariano’s career stats and then create an imaginary player who improves on all of them by 10%, but somehow that doesn’t really help to answer the question of whether it’s realistic to think there could be such a player.  I think a better way to think about it is to try to answer this question: has any reliever ever established a sustained level of performance, over multiple years, that is better than Mariano’s standard level of performance?  If so, then at least there is a foundation for how a reliever could be better than Mo, if he could sustain that performance over a longer period of time.

To try to answer that question, I looked for the greatest sustained peak stretches of relief pitching in history, where a sustained peak is defined as of at least 3 consecutive years of pitching that is at least in the neighborhood of Mariano’s average level.  I was able to find 19 such stretches:

  • Goose Gossage 1975, 1977-1985
  • Trevor Hoffman 1996-2001
  • Billy Wagner 1999, 2001-2006
  • Joe Nathan 2004-2009
  • Francisco Rodriguez 2004-2008
  • Keith Foulke 1999-2004
  • Jonathan Papelbon 2006-2009
  • Dennis Eckersley 1987-1992
  • Bruce Sutter 1976-1980
  • John Wetteland 1993-1998
  • Troy Percival 1995-1997
  • Craig Kimbrel 2012-2017
  • Kenley Jansen 2013-2017
  • Dan Quisenberry 1980-1985
  • Hoyt Wilhelm 1961-1965
  • Aroldis Chapman 2012-2016
  • Eric Gagne 2002-2004
  • Zach Britton 2014-2016
  • Joakim Soria 2007-2010

Then I compared those stretches to Mariano’s entire career, excepting 1995, when he was a starter, and 2012, when he was injured.

In a couple of cases, I allowed a skip year.  Wagner 2000 and Mariano 2012 were injury years, so I left them out.  Gossage 1976 was the year where Paul Richards tried to make him a starter, so I threw that out.

To measure the quality of each reliever, I used the following stats (all data from fangraphs):

  • Average WAR
  • Average WPA
  • Average RE24
  • Average WPA/LI
  • ERA-

I then stack ranked each statistic individually 1-20 and added the stack ranks together to create a cumulative score for each reliever.  The best possible score would be 5; the worst would be 100. 

There is nothing magical about this particular selection of statistics for measuring reliever quality. WPA seems to be a favored statistic for reliever, and I understand why, but I think it’s important to balance that with some non-contextual stats, for one simple reason: a reliever largely does not control his context.  For that reason, it doesn’t seem fair to evaluate a reliever completely on context-dependent stats. So I created a blended statistic combining content-dependent and context-independent stats.

Anyway, here are the results:

PlayerYear# SeasonsWAR AvgWPA AvgRE24 AvgWPA/LI AvgERA- AvgWAR RankWPA RankRE24 RankWPA/LI RankERA- RankTotal Score
Eric Gagne2002-200433.905.7824.932.7345112149
Joe Nathan2004-200962.374.0023.191.97428447326
Jonathan Papelbon2006-200942.453.9822.961.863875510229
Zack Britton2014-201631.874.3423.242.123418235129
Keith Foulke1999-200462.123.3325.712.20521412121241
Mariano Rivera1996-2011, 2013172.253.2920.561.914591388442
Goose Gossage1975, 1977-1985102.733.6620.301.7854399121548
Dennis Eckersley1987-199262.553.2420.262.14536151031448
Dan Quisenberry1980-198561.923.8821.752.1361166741952
Billy Wagner1999, 2001-200672.163.5419.271.88471311139854
Troy Percival1995-199731.933.8722.851.67521576141254
Bruce Sutter1976-198053.223.2519.451.846021412111756
Joakim Soria2007-201041.754.0718.881.52452031416457
Craig Kimbrel2012-201762.233.0416.031.524510161617463
Francisco Rodriguez2004-200852.223.5916.611.5150121015181065
Trevor Hoffman1996-200162.233.6915.511.766010818131766
Aroldis Chapman2012-201652.582.4415.761.51474191719867
Kenley Jansen2013-201752.562.9814.751.575451720151572
Hoyt Wilhelm1961-196551.862.3220.182.046119201161975
John Wetteland1993-199861.902.6315.461.4850171819201084

I would group these into 3 categories. Keep in mind, we are comparing these relievers’ peaks with Rivera’s average.

1)      Definitely better than Mariano – Gagne, Nathan, Papelbon, Britton

2)      Similar to Mariano’s level, and would at least have an argument – Foulke, Gossage, Eckersley, Quisenberry, Wagner, Percival, Sutter, Soria

3)      Really good, but not at Mariano’s level – Kimbrel, K-Rod, Hoffman, Chapman, Jansen, Wilhelm, Wetteland

From this, I conclude that four relievers have succeeded at establishing a level that was, for a sustained period of time, better than Mariano’s average.

1)      Gagne 2002-2004.  I don’t think there can be any argument that Gagne’s 2002-2004 level of performance represents the greatest three-year stretch of relief pitching in the history of baseball.

2)      Britton 2014-2016.  Almost as good as Gagne.  Only his WAR is dragging him down, which is probably an anomaly of some kind.  WAR for relief pitchers is a bit sketchy anyway.

3)      Papelbon 2006-2009.  Incredible.  He had other good years, but there was clearly a drop-off in performance after 2009 where he went from elite to just good.

4)      Nathan 2004-2009.  I have to admit that I found this surprising.  I knew Nathan was good, but I didn’t know he was this good.  It’s worth noting that he got hurt in 2010 and had TJ surgery.  After the injury, he worked his way back to one more great season in 2012 at age 38 before finally dropping off the cliff.

So where does that leave us?  The longest period where any reliever has been better than Mariano is Joe Nathan from 2004-2009.  IF he hadn’t gotten hurt and had maintained the same level of performance through 2012, and IF he had been moved to the bullpen prior to age 28, then maybe, just maybe, you have a reliever who could challenge Mariano.

Of course I am leaving aside the whole subject of postseason performance, which is another massive element of Mariano’s greatness.  Even 14 years of Joe Nathan’s best probably isn’t enough to make up for Mariano’s postseason heroics, but it would be a good debate.